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 The Brazilian Economy, 1980-1994
1   
 





There was a sharp change of course for the Brazilian economy in 1980. Its outstanding 
growth performance since 1900 became mediocre: GDP per capita increased at the rate of 
less than 0.1% yearly between 1980 and 1994.
3 This performance would improve only 
slightly in the decade after 1994. Agriculture maintained its share in GDP around 10% 
from the mid-1970’s to the end of the century while the share of manufacturing industry 
fell from its peak of 34% in the mid-1970’s to 28% in 1990 and remained constant 
afterwards. A succession of external shocks in an indexed economy in the 1970s ended 
up causing rising inflation and a deep financial crisis of the Brazilian State whose 
contribution to domestic savings became negative. The record of the State as an 
entrepreneur also deteriorated, not only because of the rising number of wrong decisions 
in the 1970s – pace the megalomaniac nuclear programme – but also because public 
investment was affected by deep cuts in the early 1980’s. As the balance of trade 
increased and the inflow of direct foreign investment was much reduced, Brazil became 
an exporter of resources and net foreign savings became negative.  
 
Most of the government efforts during the period were centred in achieving the elusive 
return to price stability and also in overhauling the role of the state. This included 
attempts to reform inefficient public policies and to improve the quality of public 
expenditure and also efforts to improve efficiency in the provision of goods and services 
by government or state-owned enterprises. Towards the end of the 1980s there were 
initial efforts to reduce high protection. In the 1990s trade liberalization and the 
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privatization of public-owned assets was deepened and, in 1993-94, there was success in 
reducing inflation on a sustained basis after many failed attempts since the early 1980s. 
 
1.  Debt crisis and high inflation, 1980-1985    
 
In 1981-1983 Brazil suffered its worse recession on record, certainly the most severe in 
the 20
th century, as GDP fell 4.9% from its peak in 1980.  Massive trade surpluses, the 
strong recovery of the United States economy in 1984 and the fall in international interest 
rates made possible a return to current account equilibrium in 1984-1985. There was 
recovery in the level of economic activity – with GDP growing on average 7% in 1984-
85 – but yearly inflation doubled again to reach the 200% yearly mark. During 1985, the 
first year of civilian government after the 1964 military coup, attempts to control inflation 
based on contractionary monetary and fiscal policies failed. The stage was set for the 
adoption of a long succession of failed heterodox stabilization plans between 1986 and 
1991 until the Real plan of 1993-1994 successfully reduced yearly inflation to single digit 
numbers on a sustained basis.  
 
The fuite en avant policies, adopted roughly between mid-1979 and mid-1980, attempted 
to repeat the success achieved by the sharp change of policies in 1967-1968, once again 
under the inspiration of Antônio Delfim Netto. They resulted in what Mário Simonsen,    
Minister of Finance 1974-79 and Minister of Planning in 1979, has classified as a 
“resounding  failure”.  GDP increased 9.1% in 1980, but inflation roughly doubled to 
around 100% yearly. In an economy where prices were heavily indexed it proved 
impossible to give credibility to the announcement by the government of declining future 
inflation targets. Failure led to a long period which extended until 1985 and was marked 
by unsuccessful policies designed to control domestic demand through restrictive fiscal 
and, mainly, monetary policies which simply did not work.  
 
Between September 1980 and November 1982, recessive policies were domestically- 
inspired and recourse to the IMF was discounted as not necessary.  There was a clear 
intention to postpone IMF-supported adjustment as this was considered to be too onerous 
politically and the effect of such a decision on the outcome of the November 1982   4
elections was feared. This stance became extremely difficult to hold after the Mexican 
moratorium in August 1982 given the balance of payments constraints. Indeed, only three 
days after the elections, the government announced that it was seeking international 
financial support and opening negotiations with the Fund.  
 
From the end of 1980 to mid-1984 economic policy was mainly defined with an eye on 
the external constraint. Reserves had fallen US$ 3.3 billion in 1979, then a further US$ 
3.5 billion in 1980. The current account deficit reached US$ 12.8 billion in 1980, in spite 
of a sharp rise in exports. After September 1980, it became clear that foreign capital had 
been unconvinced by the policy of trying to establish ex ante targets for the exchange rate 
and domestic inflation attempted after September 1979.  
 
The next few years would be marked by a clear official commitment to conventional 
policies targeting demand to control inflation. There were recurrent declarations of faith 
in orthodox policies in spite of consistent failure. Policies adopted included: high interest 
rates, selective control of credit, cuts in government expenditures and wage squeeze 
through interference with rules of indexation (to correct for inflation) of wages beyond a 
certain threshold. High interest rates had the additional attraction of compelling economic 
agents to find finance abroad, something still possible until 1982. With the fall in 
domestic activity, vent for surplus exports were be induced, as producers had no domestic 
outlet for their output. Emphasis on expenditure-switching was prevented by difficulties 
to further devalue the domestic currency in real terms given the recent loss of credibility 
entailed by the attempt to preannounce yearly devaluation and inflation. It was also 
thought that the economy faced productive capacity constraints. 
 
Recession begins    
 
Pre-fixation of inflation was jettisoned and a whole range of orthodox restrictions was in 
introduced after the end of 1980. Wages were contained – but low wages were still to be 
indexed above inflation – and credit was restricted, but exceptions were established for 
activities related to exports, energy and agriculture. Restrictions were imposed on the   5
growth of the liquidity. Interest rates were allowed to increase in a vain effort to induce 
indebtedness abroad. Expenditures by state enterprises were curtailed especially 
investment. Taxes were increased. Inflation accelerated to 120% on a yearly basis by 
mid-1981 in spite of all restrictions on demand. It receded only modestly in answer to a 
favorable harvest.  
 
Alternative interpretations of inflation which underlined the importance of inflationary 
inertia in a heavily indexed economy started to gain strength. Inflation today was to a 
large extent a result of inflation yesterday and without interference with nearly full price 
indexation conventional demand squeeze was doomed to failure. But these ideas took 
some time to spread and several failed stabilization attempts between 1986 and 1991 to 
be refined. The adoption of contractionary policies and the wage squeeze led to the sharp 
fall in the level of activity in 1981-1983, especially sharp in the industrial product which 
fell more than 16%. Contractionary policies had more success in reversing the trade 
imbalance which had followed the oil shock. There was a savage deterioration in the 
terms of trade: after a fall of more than 35% between 1977 – a peak similar to 1973 -- and 
1980, they fell a further 15.4% in 1981-1983. In 1983 they were almost 40% lower than 
the 1970-72 average. A trade deficit of almost US$ 3 billion in 1979 and 1980 was 
modestly reversed in 1981 and 1982, exports increased rapidly, with a reversal in 1982, 
but import contraction played a major role in response to foreign exchange devaluation 
and import controls.   
 
There was more of the same in 1982. Same policies, almost no growth, stable inflation. 
Agricultural product fell 0.4% after growing almost 9% in 1980-81. This was a bitter 
blow for the government as the economic strategy was based on enhancing exports, 
especially of agricultural products, and, at least in principle, on fostering the substitution 
of oil consumption by other forms of energy. There was substitution of petrol by alcohol. 
Ex post there was much criticism of the Brazilian policy of stimulus to alcohol 
consumption but this criticism fails to take into account the extremely high future prices 
of oil included in the forecast of international organizations such as the World Bank. The 
current account deficit peaked in 1982 at more than US$ 16 billion, almost 81% of   6
exports, the result of the cumulative effect of high indebtedness and rates of interest – 
including spread allowing for Brazilian risk – above 20%.   
 
A change more of form than of substance in economic policies was brought about by the 
Mexican crisis of August 1982. During a transition period there was financial support by 
the United States Treasury, the Bank for International Settlements and creditor banks. 
After the elections of November Brazil formally agreed to submit a programme to the 
IMF. The agreement with private banks included US$ 4.4 billion of new money, 
refinancing of 1983 amortizations in eight years and unwritten assurances of banks on 
commercial lines of credit and credit to Brazilian banks. With a time lag negotiations 
were also concluded with official creditors in the Paris Club. But domestic contractionary 
policies continued to be very much the same. 
   
Relations between the Brazilian authorities and the IMF had been traditionally quite 
difficult and nothing happened in the 1980s which contributed to improve this record. 
Between 1983 and 1985 Brazil signed no less than seven letters of intent as changed 
conditions had impact on agreed conditionalities.  
 
It was initially agreed with the IMF to establish a target of US$ 6.9 billion for current 
account deficit with an implied trade surplus of US$ 6 billion. Inflation was to be reduced 
to 70%. Public sector borrowing requirements and net domestic credit were to be halved. 
In early 1983 the corrective factor of 1.1 to be applied to half-year readjustments which 
favoured wages under three minimum wages was abandoned. Average real wages fell 
15% in 1983. A revised letter of intent was presented almost immediately as targets had 
to be adjusted to take into account a significant (30%, domestic currency/foreign 
currency) devaluation of the exchange rate in February 1983. And other revisions 
followed.  
 
By far the most important development in the relations with the IMF was the success by 
Brazil in convincing the Fund to accept a revision of the definition of performance 
criteria in an economy with high inflation. This was about differences on nominal and   7
real concepts in the definition of a deficit. It was impossible to achieve public sector 
borrowing requirements targets when so much of the nominal deficit reflected high 
inflation. A new concept of indebtedness was introduced by deducting from public sector 
borrowing requirements the component that resulted from monetary and foreign 
exchange correction of the past debt.  This was an effort to segregate the effects of 
indexation from those of the excess of expenditures in relation to revenues. So the 
concept of operational deficit entered the stage: it was the primary deficit (expenditures 
less revenues) plus real interest payments. Nominal deficit would include nominal 
interest payments. The divergence between nominal and operational deficit increases 
with the rate of inflation and with the level of public debt. 
 
Recession continued in 1983: GDP fell 2.8% and the industrial product more than 5%. 
Industrial employment fell 7.5% and there was a reduction in the level of gross capital 
formation as a share of GDP from 23% in 1982 to 18.9% in 1983. But what was 
somewhat surprising was that investment fell less than could be anticipated by such a 
sustained reduction in output in 1980-1994. The reasons for this are complex. The impact 
of public expenditure cuts hit investment very hard. Rather than concentrating the cuts in 
the projects with a lower rate of return the government tended to cut over the board so 
that completion of many projects was postponed. Project rates of return fell significantly. 
Less productive capacity was created by unit of investment. Prices of capital goods 
increased significantly as protection favouring domestic products remained very high. 
Accelerating inflation provided a further stimulus to overinvestment as protection against 
inflation was sought as had been the case in other episodes of high inflation elsewhere. 
High inflation also induced a rise in construction costs as contractors sought protection 
from higher uncertainty concerning their future earnings.      
 
Success in balance of payments adjustment was sustained as all external targets were met. 
The current account deficit fell to 2.7% GDP. But improvement was more because of 
import contraction than of export expansion (in relation to targets agreed with IMF). Oil 
prices fell modestly and the share of domestic production in the apparent consumption 
increased to 34.7% (from 14% in 1979). Imports fell to 6.8% of GDP. The impossibility   8
of meeting the nominal targets agreed with IMF led a suspension of scheduled 
disbursements and protracted negotiations on changes in nature of future targets. With 
inflows of foreign capital half their peak in 1981 (or 1978, for that matter) and 
shortcomings in the inflow of IMF resources, arrears accumulated as had happened in the 
1930s. Uncertainty led to a widening of the wedge between the official and black market 
exchange rates and the premium exceeded 100% at its peak. Exchange control may have 
played a role in making Brazil a peculiar case in Latin America as there was limited 
capital flight if compared with other countries. More importantly, a significant share of 
foreign debt was indexed to the US dollar and after the late 1970s borrowers in foreign 
currency were allowed to hedge their foreign exchange risk by making deposits in the 
central bank. For all relevant purposes the Brazilian overall foreign debt became a 
responsibility of the Federal government in another chapter in a long history of 
socialization of losses.   
 
All the good work in the balance of payments side was obscured by the acceleration of 
inflation from a plateau of 100% to 200% yearly as the impact of exchange rate 
devaluation worked its way through the indexation system and agricultural prices were 
under pressure after a second year of reduction in agricultural product.   
 
Net foreign transfer which had peaked at almost 6% of GDP in  1974 and generally 
hovered around 3% in the 1970s (1977 excepted) fell after 1980 and became negative 
after 1982. It was negative for the rest of the 1980s with peaks of almost 5% in 1984 and 
more than 4% in 1988. Balance of payments restrictions to growth were very early in 
1980s superseded by fiscal constraints as a severe financial crisis hit the Brazilian public 
sector. There was further deterioration of public accounts in a process that had started in a 
limited way after the mid-1970s. Public sector savings shrank from 6-8% of GDP in 
1970-1977 to 3-5% in the late 1970s and declined sharply afterwards to became 
insignificant in 1984 (and negative in 1985). Total savings came to depend almost 
exclusively on the private sector. A combination of a decline in current revenue as a % of 
GDP, a rise in current non-interest expenditure and a rise in inflation-corrected interest 
payments led to public sector borrowing operational (as opposed to nominal) 
requirements in the 4-5% of GDP range, rather in excess of levels in the mid-1970s. The   9
sharp rise in operational PSBR in 1976-79 had been of a totally different nature as it 
resulted from very high levels of government investment.  Total inflation transfers – 
including inflation tax on holders of cash and inflation transfers related to non-indexed 
assets held by the financial sector – reached a post-1964 peak of 6.3% of GDP in 1980 
then stabilized at 4-5% compared to the 3-4% typical of 1974-78.   
 
1984 without embellishment   
 
After three years of deep recession, 1984 marked a recovery of the activity level: GDP 
increased 5.7% with industrial output leading with an expansion of 7%. Favourable 
growth performance was dominated by exports which increased by 23%, a result of the 
strength of United States demand. Trade balance increased to reach more than US$ 13 
billion as domestic oil production covered almost 50% of apparent consumption. The 
import-GDP ratio fell further to 6.3%, the current account deficit disappeared and more 
than US$ 7 billion were added to the reserves.  
 
Attempted ex post autobiographical embellishments by Brazilian policy-makers have 
prompted much self congratulation on the achievements of 1984 and the inheritance left 
to the new government that took office in March 1985. But these achievements tend to be 
concentrated on the balance of payments. The yearly inflation rate was stable at more 
than 200% in spite of a better crop in 1984. 
 
As yearly inflation rose, and then stabilized, at 200% interpretations which stressed the 
inertial element of Brazilian inflationary process evolved from analytical efforts to policy 
proposals. Some proposed that in a transitional period two kinds of money should co-
exist: old currency and a new indexed money. Prices and wages would be voluntary 
converted to the new indexed money. Inflation will be eliminated as transition to the new 
currency became universal. A shock version of stabilization policies based on the inertial 
diagnosis relied on an abrupt end to indexation rules coupled with a freezing of all prices 
(including the foreign exchange rate) and wages.  
    10
In February 1984 a further waiver was obtained from the FMI and a fifth letter of intent 
made domestic targets less restrictive. Inflation rate would be halved in relation to 1983. 
But as inflation remained stable around 200% yearly a sixth letter of intent was required 
in September to cope with the impact of such failure on domestic targets. In early 1985 
the government engaged in the negotiation of a seventh letter of intent with the IMF 
which would incorporate rescheduling of debt amortization payments, but this was 
aborted by the failure to meet the conditionalities for the last quarter of 1984.  
 
As oil imports increased to reach a peak of 52.8% of total imports in 1983 – compared to 
around 30% on average in 1976-78 and 11.5% in 1973 – the share of the Organization of 
the Petroleum Exporting Countries in imports rose to 40% in 1984 mostly crowding out 
the European Community. Exports to the EEC also fell while those to the United States 
rose spectacularly as the United States economy recovered in 1984. The share of exports 
to OPEP economies doubled to 10% since 1979. Manufactured exports rose from 43.6% 
in 1979 to 56% in 1984  propped by vent for surplus as the deep recession stimulated 
producers to find alternative outlets for their output and also by massive GATT-illegal 
subsidies whose temporary return was allowed by creditor countries unwilling to interfere 
with the increase in trade surplus required to partly service the foreign debt. These 
subsidies peaked at 33% per unit value of manufactured exports.   
 
Brazil had faced much pressure during the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade concerning the legality of its 
extensive use of export subsidies. The new Code of Subsidies made it illegal to subsidize 
exports by means of direct tax rebates and payments above tax rebates of indirect taxes. 
The United States applied intense pressure to make sure that Brazil would sign this 
particular code and agree to discontinue its illegal export subsidies, even if it was to 
relent later when Brazil needed to substantially increase its trade surplus to service its 
foreign debt after 1982.  
 
The multilateral trade negotiations in the GATT between 1982 and 1986 were marked by 
skirmishes between a small group of developing economies, including Brazil and India,   11
and the developed economies with the United States in the forefront. The differences 
focused on the “new themes” – intellectual property, foreign investment and services – 
which the developed economies wished included in the agenda and a small group of 
developing countries which did not.  
 
Back to civilian government 
 
The first civilian government after 1964 took office in March 1985 under dramatic 
circumstances as Tancredo Neves, the victorious presidential candidate, had become 
gravely ill and was to die after a long agony. His vice-president, José Sarney, a seasoned 
old-school politician with long record of cozy links with the military, became the new 
president. The year of 1985 may be seen as a muddled interregnum. It marked the failure 
of still another attempt to do away with inflation by gradual means. There was the 
intention in January 1985, in the last days of the previous government, to negotiate with 
the IMF an agreement similar to that with Mexico that would include a reschedule of 
foreign debt. But the way was blocked as Brazil had failed to meet targets on nominal 
debt and operational deficit. Negotiations with banks were also postponed as an 
agreement which would result in a reduction of debt service payments (but no debt 
reduction), following the lines of a Baker Plan, depended on reaching agreement with the 
IMF. It has been suggested that the IMF tended to become less important for Brazil for 
two related reasons. The difficulties in the early 1980s had made it clear that direct 
financial support by the Fund was insufficient to cope with the Brazilian balance of 
payments disequilibrium. And its seal of quality seemed perhaps less essential to 
guarantee an agreement with the banks. Interim measures postponed a new explicit 
agreement debt with the banks from the beginning of 1985 until well into 1986. 
 
The electoral manifesto of Tancredo Neves had included ideas of a Pacto Social. But 
policies actually implemented, while paying lip-service to orthodoxy, were confused, 
piecemeal and volatile. Initial monetary and fiscal policies under Sarney were restrictive. 
There were cuts in expenditures and a freeze in the hiring of civil servants. Prices were 
frozen in April and there was an attempt to extend inflation memory beyond the very   12
short term: monetary and exchange rate correction would be defined by the geometrical 
average of inflation in the three previous months.  There was a compression of costs of 
inputs until mid-year. The following price decompression together with an agricultural 
supply shock drove monthly inflation back to 14% in August.  
 
Friction between ministers in favour and against orthodox policies led to the fall of the 
nominally orthodox Minister of Finance, Dornelles, an appointment of his uncle 
Tancredo Neves. The way was open to heterodoxy with the appointment of Dilson 
Funaro, a Paulista entrepreneur in the left of the political spectre of interests supporting 
the new civilian government. There was less preoccupation with the control of monetary 
base and a fall in real interest rates was allowed to occur. The economy was back to a 
monthly inflationary memory to define monetary and foreign exchange correction: the 
avowed limited aim was to stabilize inflation at 10% monthly. The economy was in the 
way to full indexation but public prices lagged as plans to eliminate the public deficit by 
a fiscal package at the end of the year were shelved. 
 
With the inflation at this level it was impossible to maintain wage readjustment on a half-
year basis. But there was no clear rule on wage indexation, still officially based on half 
year adjustments as established by legislation back in 1979. Several options on wage 
policies were considered: quarterly adjustments; monthly adjustments; scala mobile with 
a trigger of 30% (eventually used in the Cruzado plan of 1986); monthly pre-set 
adjustments defined on a quarterly basis (used in the Bresser plan of 1987). Free 
negotiations of abonos and other temporary measures were allowed while new general 
policies were defined, but could not be taken into account by price control authorities 
when agreeing with price increases. 
 
There were good external results in this transitional year as the trade surplus, helped by a 
fall in oil prices and in spite of a contraction of exports of 5.1%, reached US$ 1 billion 
monthly. The level of reserves increased to US$ 11.6 billion. This allowed Brazil to keep 
the IMF at arm’s length as there was no demand for further resources. Creditor banks 
were accommodated with an extension of former agreement. Some recovery of domestic   13
sales compensated for the contraction of exports in relation to 1984: GDP increased 8.1% 
evenly distributed between industry, agriculture and services. But with the accelerating 
inflation to reach 16.2% in January 1986, the economy was heading towards a new 
plateau of 400-500% yearly inflation, double the level that had been inherited from the 
former government. A shift to a shock strategy against inflation on the lines of that had 
been adopted in Argentina started to be seriously considered. 
 
                        
2.  Failed stabilization attempts, 1986-1990   
   
 
1981-1985 had been a period of accelerating inflation and average low economic growth 
in spite the improved growth performance in 1984-85. Economic policies remained very 
much in the path of orthodoxy after the fuite en avant of 1980 had failed. After the 
transitional year of 1985 there was a series of policy experiments based on the diagnosis 
that inertial inflation played a major role in explaining chronic high inflation. The 
Argentinean and Israeli examples served as a permanent reference for Brazilian policy-
makers.  
 
The succession of failed stabilization attempts in 1986-1989 combined different blends of 
fiscal and monetary policies with devices to break price indexation. The main fragility 
was related to structural obstacles to fiscal adjustment. The government was unable to 
stop the deterioration of its capacity to generate savings. There was a high volatility of 
inflation and growth rates. But on average this continued to be a period of high inflation 
and economic stagnation. As successive heterodox stabilization programmes failed it 
became increasingly difficult to break inflationary inertia as economic agents tended to 
learn from previous experiences. With the succession of complex sets of different rules 
concerning price indexation the scope for judicial disputes involving price indexation was 
enormously expanded. It would become increasingly difficult for future governments to 
anticipate their liability in relation to the lagged financial consequences of the periodical 
release of skeletons in the cupboard involving price indexation by judicial decisions 
which took a very long time.    14
 
Financial problems were compounded by the approval of a flawed Constitution in 1988 
which contributed to a further deterioration of the central government financial stance as 
it decentralized revenues but not responsibility for the corresponding expenditures.  
 
The Cruzado plan   
 
The Cruzado plan was the first in a series of attempted stabilization programmes 
introduced after 1986 which, in contrast with the past, included features that indicated a 
radical change in the explanation of the causes of inflation. It abandoned the previous 
emphasis on demand inflation and singled out inflationary inertia as the main explanatory 
variable for persistent inflation. It was a shock rather than a gradual policy. A new 
currency was introduced, the cruzado, worth 1,000 cruzeiros. The last monetary reform 
had been in 1967 when the 1942 cruzeiro lost three zeros. Confusingly, after a short 
period when the monetary unit was the cruzeiro novo there had been a reversal in 1971 to 
the name cruzeiro. One cruzado was thus worth 1,000 cruzeiros of, say, 1985, and 
1,000,000 of the 1942 cruzeiros.  
 
The features of the stabilization plan reflected the widely different views of policy-
makers involved in its formulation and implementation. These were costs difficult to 
avoid in the interaction of more technically minded policy-makers or advisers as 
compared with those more aligned with PMDB – Partido do Movimento Democrático 
Brasileiro – the umbrella-style opposition party that had been victorious in the 1984 with 
Dilson Funaro, a Brazilian industrialist with a taste for heterodoxy in the Ministry of 
Finance. The program bore the marks of the difficult political accommodation between 
these different groups.   
 
Inertial interpretations of the inflationary process in an indexed economy had evolved to 
two main policy proposals. The one adopted in 1986 in the cruzado plan relied on a 
heterodox shock framework: currency substitution, price freeze, disindexation and 
neutralization of the distributive effects of disinflation. The major alternative of a gradual   15
transition to a new currency through a period of coexistence of the old and a temporary 
indexed currency together with other elements would constitute the backbone of the 
successful Real plan of 1993-1994. 
 
Prices in cruzeiros were converted in prices in cruzados by taking the average of prices in 
the past six months. Only electricity prices were adjusted by 20% as they were 
considered to have lagged in relation to other prices. All prices, including rents and the 
exchange rate, were frozen. There were attempts to neutralize the redistributive impact of 
the plan. Wages were to be converted in cruzados taking into account their level in the 
last six months. However, in what critics have singled out as “concessions to populism” 
there was a 8% further adjustment for the benefit of all wage earners rising to 16% in the 
case of the legal minimum wage. Yearly wage negotiations (dissídios) would adjust 
wages by 60% of inflation as measured by the cost of living index. A further wage 
concession was to introduce a mechanism inspired in the Italian scala mobile which 
would trigger an automatic wage adjustment every time inflation reached 20%.  
   
Rules had also to be established for the adjustment of contracts involving future 
payments. There were two types of contracts. There were contracts where interest rates 
were determined on an ex post basis as an addition of “monetary correction” to “pure” 
interest rate component.  In this case the new rates simply excluded monetary correction. 
In the other type of contract the interest rate was fixed ex ante. An official table of 
conversion of interest rates was adopted. It was a tablita  similar to that of the 
Argentinean shock stabilization that had preceded the cruzado plan.  
 
Monetary and fiscal policies were left to the discretion of authorities with the idea that 
they would be adjusted to the speed of remonetization that was to occur as economic 
agents showed an increasing willingness to carry cash with the fall in inflation rate. Fiscal 
policy was considered to have been defined by the fiscal package of December 1985. 
This did not take into account that inflationary tax would be lost by stabilization and also 
of the impossibility of raising revenue based, as had been usual in the past, on the 
taxation of nominal capital gains boosted by high inflation.   16
  
The success of the plan until mid-1986 was spectacular with corresponding popular 
enthusiasm. The illusion that political mobilization could replace markets in price 
determination got hold of the nation at least temporarily. The monthly inflation rate fell 
to 0.1% in March and remained little above 1% until July. It was an apparent vindication 
of those views which stressed the possibility of achieving stability without recession and 
unemployment.  
 
Increase in purchasing power prompted by the generous wage adjustments in the 
transition compounded other sources of demand pressure. Economic agents adjusted their 
precautionary balances to a lower level of inflation and spent more.  This led to severe 
selective demand pressures. There were problems also with the “wrong freezing” of some 
prices as there was little allowance for the staggered nature of price adjustments in an 
inflationary economy. Overheating had become clear by mid-June. There were monthly 
price rises in the 4-5% range for used cars and clothing. By mid-year production of 
consumer durables had increased by one third in relation to the previous twelve months. 
Milk had to be subsidized. Beef imports to cope with the combined effect of a higher 
demand and supply constraints due to bad weather, were late, insufficient and of bad 
quality. 
 
Increased monetization induced by a higher propensity to hold cash explained a 
significant expansion of money supply. But its increase went beyond the space created by 
abrupt disinflation. Real interest rates became negative, prices of real assets shot up, the 
premium on the official foreign exchange rate more than doubled to reach almost 60% in 
mid-year, stock exchange prices rose about 50%.  
 
Tax gains related to disinflation – a reversed Tanzi effect – were small and slow. There 
was a fall in income tax collections and expenditures increased as elections in November 
approached. It was slowly admitted that the operational deficit would reach 2.5% of 
GDP, rather than the 0.5% mentioned earlier on, and it became increasingly clear that 
there was to be either a contraction of demand or an end to the price freeze. Attempts to   17
win the president to the decision of imposing a demand contraction in May failed. The 
idea that stabilization could be obtained by a costless trick had obvious political appeal. 
 
Failure of the Cruzado plan 
 
Small adjustments made in late July – the so-called stop-gap Cruzadinho [small Cruzado] 
plan – included a timid fiscal package involving compulsory “loans” on fuel, motor cars 
purchases, international air tickets and foreign exchange sales for travel expenses, some 
of which were in theory to be refunded in three years.  The government started to attempt 
to fiddle with the comprehensiveness of the coverage of price indices to avoid triggering 
the  scala mobile. Low inflation indices persisted but did not reflect real inflation as 
“new” products were marketed, side payments failed to be captured by collected prices 
and scarcity of products started to reduce the size of the sample used to measure inflation. 
Speculation about foreign exchange devaluation led to a leads and lags situation where 
exports were postponed and imports stockpiled. The wedge between the official and 
parallel market rates increased to 90%. Exports fell rapidly (almost 13% on a yearly 
basis) in spite of a big but short-lived improvement in the terms of trade. A small 
devaluation in October was followed by the announcement of a return to a policy of small 
devaluations to avoid a major overvaluation of the cruzado.   
 
A stage II of the Cruzado plan in the end of the year was announced after a resounding 
victory for PMDB, the government party.  A fiscal package of about 4% of GDP was 
introduced and public prices -- fuel, electricity, telephone and postal services – increased. 
Revenues were to finance a rather delirious plan of investments aiming at a rate of 
growth of 7% yearly. There was much debate on technicalities involving the coverage of 
price indices and how the scala mobile should be applied in an effort to postpone 
inflationary inertia. Industrial output peaked in September at a yearly rate of growth 
exceeding 12%. In 1986 as a whole GDP increased by 8% on a year to year basis but the 
agricultural product fell almost 8% compounding the demand-related inflationary 
pressures.  
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The economy was showing clear signs of overheating. Inflation returned at full speed and 
price indexation was reintroduced to adjust the foreign exchange rate and to define the ex 
post rate of return on financial instruments. In the beginning of 1987 monthly inflation 
had reached almost 17%. Attempts to reach a pacto social failed, price control was ended 
and price indexation on a monthly basis reintroduced. 
 
In early 1986 a new agreement with foreign creditors had been signed. For the first time 
there was no previous agreement with the International Monetary Fund. The agreement 
with the banks involved a rescheduling of amortization payments due in 1985 and the 
provision that payments due in 1986 were to be hold as sight deposits in the Brazilian 
Central Bank until April 1987. Commercial and interbank credit lines were to be 
maintained at agreed levels. But the cruzado plan affected the balance of  payments 
unfavourably by the perverse combination of supply and demand shocks. Negative trade 
balances started to accumulate in the last quarter of the year. Imports were rationed as the 
level of reserves fell. Foreign debt interest payments to private banks were suspended in 
February 1987. The official reasons advanced to justify default were to stop the loss of 
reserves and to prepare the ground for a new phase of negotiations. When Funaro left in 
April, monthly inflation was beyond 20% and the foreign debt was in default.  
 
In search of stabilization: 1987-1989 
 
From mid-1987 to March 1990 three further stabilization attempts of varying degrees of 
ambition were made. They failed much faster than had been the case with the cruzado 
plan: the Bresser plan of mid-1987, the feijão com arroz [beans and rice] policy of 1988 
and the Verão [Summer] plan of 1989. Monthly inflation rate in the last month of the 
Sarney government was in excess of 80% and the average growth rate of GDP in 1987-
1989 had been of only 2.2%. Democracy failed to deliver both low inflation and high 
growth. 
 
Bresser Pereira, the new Minister of Finance from May 1987, announced modest growth 
targets and showed some inclination to speak to the IMF in the face of opposition by his   19
own party. There were rumours of a heterodox shock but in fact the Bresser plan of June 
1987 was no attempt to completely eliminate inflation. Its limited aims were to end the 
wage scala mobile and to reduce public deficit so as to make possible to sustain lower 
rates of inflation. In its more general commitments the plan stressed the need of 
autonomy for the Central Bank in the definition of monetary policy and commitments to 
unify all Federal government budgets, to improve budgetary practices and not to resort to 
monetary expansion to cover deficits.  
 
Prices were frozen but not before several public and administered prices were adjusted. 
Wages and rents were frozen for 3 months but the exchange rate was flexible. The 
correction of public and administered prices was not allowed to be taken into account in a 
correction of wages. Contracts with pre-fixed nominal interest rates were discounted 
using a tablita. There was an attempt to extend the price pre-fixation time span horizon to 
three months. A new wage indexation rule based on the URP (Unidade de Referência de 
Preços) [Unit of reference of prices] was introduced. Each quarter the values for the URP 
in the next three months were preset, based on the geometrical average of monthly rates 
in the previous three months. Some have considered the plan’s conception as naive as 
inflationary inertia was only broken by the price freeze and after that inflation was fully 
transmitted on a quarterly basis.   
  
There were initial intentions to pursue active fiscal and monetary policies and in 
particular to reduce public deficit from a projected 6.7% of GDP to 3.5%. But initial 
efforts to increase revenues and reduce expenditures were rather modest covering only 
about one third of the gap. A Plano de Coerência Macroeconômica [Plan of 
macroeconomic coherence], announced in July was important as the first clearly stated 
demonstration of concern with fiscal equilibrium since orthodoxy had gained the upper 
hand in the beginning of 1986. Emphasis was placed on the recovery of government 
savings which had reached more than 4% of GDP in the mid 1970s and  were now 
negligible. A cut in expenditures, including subsidies, coupled with a raise in public 
prices, which had been eroded in the long term, plus a progressive tax reform was to 
increase public savings from zero to 5.3% of GDP in four years. This would make   20
possible an investment ratio of more than 24% of GDP and yearly growth of GDP of 7% 
after 1989. Putting public accounts in order was to prove elusive for many years ahead. 
So would high growth on a sustained basis. In the three remaining years of Sarney’s term 
of office gross fixed capital formation hovered around 23-26% of GDP, increasingly 
affected by high prices of construction and capital goods, while GDP growth averaged 
only 2.2%.  
  
Inflation fell from 26.1% in June to 3.1% and 6.4% in July and August. Lack of popular 
support added to dismantlement of price control limited the scope of price freezing. It has 
been contended that, in contrast with the Cruzado plan, the persistence of significant 
monthly rates inflation is to be explained by the redistributive conflict rather than by 
demand pressure. Relative prices were again misaligned in the initial price freeze.   
Already in August some price controls were abandoned and a ceiling of 10% established 
on selective “emergency” price increases. This ceiling exceeded by very far the pre-set 
4.7% adjustment of the URP and the gap created a measure of the plan’s failure. Amidst 
clear signs that fiscal imbalances persisted, monthly inflation almost trebled between 
September and the end of the year when it reached 14.1%. By the end of the year Bresser 
Pereira was out of the government. There were intense pressures from wage earners to 
recover the inflation of 26.1% in July which the Bresser plan had excluded from wage 
readjustment. To bow to pressure would put monthly inflation back to its pre-Bresser 
level. The question became emblematic of the “skeletons in the cupboard” syndrome 
which would result from most pre-1993 heterodox stabilization plans. In the end judicial 
decisions forced future governments to make the disputed payment.    
 
Exports recovered in the wake of a significant real devaluation of domestic currency and 
the deficit in the trade balance in the beginning of 1987 was transformed in a surplus after 
June. The balance of trade in 1987 was in excess of US$ 11 billion. But there were no 
developments in the foreign debt deadlock as a Brazilian proposal to float new very long-
term bonds to securitize the foreign debt was cold shouldered by the creditors. Only 
palliative measures were adopted. By the end of 1987 there was an interim agreement 
involving interest payments seeking to avoid the reclassification of Brazilian loans to   21
‘value impaired’ status in the United States.  Moratorium on foreign debt interest was 
lifted in early 1988 with a payment of US$ 1 billion out of US$ 4.5 billion due in interest 
payments.  
 
Economic policy during 1988 deliberately avoided the format of a stabilization plan: it 
was referred to as “rice and beans” policy, a mention to the most popular Brazilian dish 
as an indication that it was to remain simple and unpretentious. Targets were modest: 
monthly inflation was to be stabilized at 15% and gradual reduction of deficit estimated 
at 7-8% of GDP. Reduction in public expenditures included a temporary freeze of public 
sector wages and made possible relative success in public deficit control which was under 
4% of GDP in 1988. Monthly inflation fell under 20% with reassurances that there would 
be no new heterodox plan. But inflationary pressures returned with agricultural 
difficulties, very high trade surpluses and conversion of foreign debt into equity. Inflation 
accelerated again to reach 24% in July and 27% in October. 
 
In 1988 and 1989 there was a significant improvement in export performance which at 
around US$ 34 billion were more than 30% above their level in 1987 and almost 50% 
above the level of 1986 which had been badly affected by the Cruzado plan. Part of this 
is explained by some recovery in the terms of trade which increased to a level some 15-
20% above their through in 1983 and were to remain roughly there until 1993.  But this 
was still some 30% below the 1970-72 average terms trade. 
 
By the end of June 1988 a preliminary agreement on foreign debt was reached including 
US$ 5.2 billion of “new money” of which the first tranche of US$ 4 billion would cover 
interest arrears. The balance was conditional on negotiations with the World Bank on 
specific projects and remained undisbursed. It also included US$ 14.4 billion referring to 
the maintenance of commercial and inter-bank credit lines and US$ 1.05 billion of debt 
conversion to exit bonds with a 30% discount. In the late 1980s the net inflow of 
resources (inflow net of amortization payments) from multilateral banks such as the 
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank had become negative or 
negligible. In 1989 the net inflow was US$-166 million for World Bank loans (gross   22
inflow of US$ 903 million) and US$ 32 million for those from the IDB (gross inflow of 
US$ 280 million). Interest payments remained substantial at US$ 715 and US$ 169 
million, respectively. 
 
In the month a new Constitution was promulgated – 5 October, 1988 – inflation was 
above 27%. The Constitution was a political landmark in the process of return to a 
democratic political regime. It was also an over reaction to the 1967 constitutional text 
approved under the military. The balance of power between the central government and 
the states and municípios  shifted again in favour of decentralization. The new text 
transferred Federal revenues to states and municipalities without transferring 
responsibility for specific services. It increased earmarking of revenues, labour costs and 
put Federal expenditures under further strain. The structural obstacles to fiscal adjustment 
were strengthened by the new constitution. 
 
In September 1988 the government failed to convince the IMF to help to reach an 
agreement with its creditors in an effort to lower the risk of hyperinflation. A social pact 
to avoid hyperinflation was signed in early November between government, trade unions 
and employers limiting price and wage adjustments to a ceiling of 26.5% in November 
and 25% in December. It included a list of interim measures related to price and wage 
adjustments, inflation measurement, the format of negotiations and a loose government 
undertaking to present plan to put public finances in order. Actual inflation rates were 
26.9% and 28.8%.  “Beans and rice” had failed: yearly inflation rate rose from the 400% 
plateau to 1000% while GDP fell 0.1%. 
 
A new hybrid stabilization plan, the Plano Verão, was introduced in early 1989.  Its 
heterodox part included a monetary reform: the cruzado novo (equal 1,000 cruzados of 
1986) was introduced. The repetition of details is monotonous. All indexation was ended 
or suspended. There was an indeterminate period of price freeze. Wages and rents were 
converted into cruzados novos at the 1988 yearly average. New wage adjustment rules 
were to be decided in future negotiations. Price increases were to be absorbed 
immediately in the computation of inflation so as to avoid transmitting old inflation. The   23
exchange rate was devalued 18% (1 novo cruzado equalled US$ 1) and was fixed for an 
indeterminate period. It has been claimed that the technicalities involved in the 
conversion of contracts including a new tablita had a perverse distributive effect in 
favour of debtors and to the detriment of creditors in the case of contracts with ex post 
price indexation clauses. 
 
The orthodox side of the new plan included an emphasis in demand contraction though a 
tight monetary policy. Credit to the private sector was restricted and foreign debt 
conversion into equity suspended. High real interest rates would make rather expensive to 
speculate in physical stocks or foreign exchange. Fiscal adjustment would rely on rather 
ambitious targets for reduction of government current expenditures including wages, 
privatization of public-owned assets, among other radical intentions to control 
expenditure and increase revenue. 
 
Collapse of the plan would be faster than in the case of its predecessors. The government 
lacked credibility and, with the more radical extinction of indexation rules, inflation 
would creep back much faster than in the previous stabilization plans. A measure of the 
initial lack of credibility and of its deepening was that the US dollar rate premium in the 
unofficial market rose from 70% in the beginning of the year to 200% in May. This was 
in spite of record trade surpluses exceeding US$ 20 billion on a 12-month basis in May 
and of US$ 16 billion in 1989 as a whole. Inflation fell to 3.6% in February but was 
already 6.1% in March. With no fiscal adjustment to speak of real interest rates were 
increased significantly. Contrary to what had been anticipated by the government, the 
plan, rather than being recessive through its deficient implementation, turned out to 
stimulate an expansion of the economy which would be reflected in the 3.2% growth of 
GDP in 1989.   
 
Offers by the government to trade unions to compensate for real wage losses during the 
transitional period were deemed insufficient and a series of strikes marked a growing 
dissatisfaction with the government. After a general strike in mid-March 1989 the first 
official price readjustments started and monthly inflation reached 7.3%. In April and May   24
indexation was reintroduced, prices were officially adjusted and a new wage policy with 
an implied inflation memory of only a month was approved by Congress.  
 
As inflation accelerated and uncertainty increased there was a spike in imports as 
purchases were anticipated: imports increased from US$ 7.6 billion in the first half of 
1989 to US$ 10.7 billion in the second half of the year. Government consumption 
increased by more than then 2% of GDP between 1989 and 1990 reflecting the generous 
pay rises for civil servants in the end of the Sarney era. Public prices lagged behind 
inflation in some cases by almost 50%. The last months of the government were 
dominated by the fear of hyperinflation. In March 1990 it was beyond 80%. 
 
The Brazilian market remained rather closed in the 1980s. Brazilian share of world 
exports which was 0.9% in 1979 peaked at 1.4% in 1984 in the middle of the United 
States import boom and fell back to 1.1% in 1989. Between 1984 and 1989 manufactured 
exports hovered around 53-56% of total exports but semi-manufactured exports rose 
significantly from 11.1% to 16.8% of the total. In 1979, two thirds of Brazilian exports 
had been directed to Europe (EEC and EFTA, 32.9%), the United States (19.3%) and 
ALADI (14.7%). During the 1980s the shares of ALADI and of the rest of the world were 
eroded while that of the United States peaked in the mid-1980s at almost 30% and fell to 
24.3% in 1989. Europe’s share remained roughly constant around 29-33% throughout the 
1980s. 
 
Even with quite a good trade performance it proved impossible to service the foreign debt 
as agreed in mid-1988. Deterioration of the balance of payments position after the 
beginning of 1989 with increased profit remittances and repatriation of foreign 
investment led to suspension of transfer of interest payments on the foreign debt. 
Deposits were made in domestic currency in accounts in the Brazilian Central Bank. To 
all purposes any permanent solution of the foreign debt was postponed for 1990 under a 
new administration.  In the 1980s foreign direct investment had typically varied between 
US$ 1-2.7 billions yearly until 1988, with exception of the very low inflow in 1986. After   25
1988, as the crisis deepened, the inflow of FDI fell to reach less than US$ 0.1 billion in 
1991.  
  
The conjunction of a mediocre growth performance after 1980 with the continuous 
deterioration of the public sector financial position served as background for a growing 
willingness to reform the long standing economic strategy based on a strong State 
presence and significant protection of the domestic market that had prevailed at least 
since 1945. 
 
Successive stabilization plans in the 1980s failed to deliver stabilization. Inflation proved 
persistent and accelerated from something around 2-3% a month in the beginning of the 
1980s to more than 80% in early 1990. Growth performance was also very bad. GDP 
increased only 22.2% and manufacturing industry output only 8.3% while population 
increased 18.8%. Average gross fixed capital formation fell to about 18% in the middle 
of the decade compared to the 22-24% peaks of the 1970s and only recovered towards the 
end of the decade. But it was rather less efficient in creating additional productive 
capacity than in the earlier period because of high prices of capital goods due to 
protection, high costs of construction, postponement of public projects and the 
inducement high inflation provided to the purchase of real assets. 
 
Financial deterioration of the State portrayed by the fall in public sector savings from 
5.4% of GDP in 1981 to -4.7% of GDP in 1989 was coupled with a reduction in foreign 
savings from 4.4% of GDP to -0.2% of GDP and acted as a powerful constraint on 
investment capacity. Internal disequilibria were held responsible for the lack of growth 
rather than external disequilibrium. This contributed to some soul searching on what was 
to be the future role of the State and a limited effort to privatize public-owned assets 
started to take shape.  
  
Financial weakness of the State imposed a less active role in the distribution of subsidies. 
This affected export subsidies which went beyond indirect tax restitutions which were 
dismantled after 1983 when they reached a peak of 33% of the value of manufactured   26
exports. The slow dismantlement of the panoply of subsidies was accompanied after 1987 
by a shift of traditionally autarchic trade policies and tariff protection was reduced from 
57.5% (simple average) in 1987 to 32.4% in 1989. It is true that the initial reduction 
mainly involved water in the tariff but it had an important demonstration effect as it 
signalled that further reduction of protection was possible. This was also reflected in a 
shift of stances in relation to foreign economic policy. Rapprochement with Argentina in 
1985 – retrospectively, the main achievement of Sarney’s government – and participation 
in the Cairns coalition, which united many efficient agricultural producers who sought 
the dismantlement of protection in the developed economies, made easier a transition to a 
more positive agenda in economic diplomacy matters.  
 
The long negotiations which preceded the launching of the Uruguay Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 
Punta del Este in September 1986 were marked by continuous divergences in relation to 
the inclusion of the new issues – services, intellectual property (TRIPS), investment and 
trade (TRIMS) and high technology products – and particularly of services. Opposition 
came from a G-10 coalition of developing countries in which Brazil and India played a 
prominent role.
 In Punta del Este the G-10 was defeated as the new themes were included 
in the negotiation agenda although there was some face saving compromise by placing 
services in a separate negotiation track. Brazilian policy after Punta del Este increasingly 
stressed the agricultural demandeur aspect in detriment of the purely defensive stance in 
relation to new themes. Brazil used the GATT’s dispute settlement mechanism only 
sparingly before the 1980’s. The incidence of consultations and panels involving Brazil 
increased significantly in the 1980’s and by far the most important dispute concerned 
Brazilian complaints in relation to bilateral sanctions brandished by the United States 
based on allegations of Brazilian persistent breach of intellectual property  commitments. 
  
Deterioration of the economic scenario in the last year of Sarney’s government 
underlined the shortcomings of policies adopted since the beginning of the 1980s with a 
mediocre growth performance being accompanied by the acceleration of inflation 
approaching hyperinflation conditions. Successive governments had shown their   27
incapacity or unwillingness to deter the increased disequilibrium of public accounts. 
Brazil remained an outcast in the international financial community with the foreign debt 
question unresolved. Net real resource transfers abroad remained substantial.   
 
The repeated failure of stabilization efforts in 1986-89 had important immediate costs. It 
entailed a cumulative learning process that helped to ingrain inflation. This contributed to 
make stabilization shocks progressively less comprehensive, less effective and of shorter 
life. The private sector became more proficient in anticipating what could be the 
government moves in future stabilization attempts. Efforts to seek protection from 
accelerating inflation by anticipating price increases contribute to accelerate inflation. In 
the longer term stabilization efforts including monetary reforms and complex legislation 
on the adjustment of contractual provisions created a large scope for judicial questioning 
of governmental actions that had important delayed fiscal implications after the mid-
1980s. 
 
With some help of hindsight it is not difficult to explain why the first direct presidential 
elections since 1960 gave the victory in 1989 to a rather obscure politician from a 
peripheral region – the Northeast – who based his campaign on the denunciation of the 
excesses of State intervention including those for the benefit a small caste of highly paid  
civil servants. That Collor de Mello, the new president, did not come from the Southeast, 
nor was linked to any of the main political parties that had taken shape since re-
democratization in 1985, would have important future political and economic 
consequences.  Victory came in the second round against Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, a 
trade union leader who had emerged in the bitter fights of organized labour against the 
military in the 1970s and early 1980s and a founder of the Partido dos Trabalhadores 
[Workers Party].  
 
3. Further stabilization attempts, reforms and the Real Plan, 1990-1994   
   
Collor took office amidst widespread expectations that some kind of radical stabilization 
policy would be implemented. In fact there were two further failed stabilization attempts   28
in 1990 and 1991 – the so-called Collor I and Collor II programmes. An ambitious 
programme of structural reforms affecting the role of the State – and particularly the 
privatization of public assets – and envisaging a radical opening up of the economy 
started to be implemented. After the failure of Collor II, with the president facing 
increasing political difficulties economic policy became a damage limitation exercise 
under Marcílio Moreira. As the president’s impeachment became unavoidable, a period 
of turmoil started lasting until May 1993 when Fernando Henrique Cardoso became 
Minister of Finance. In 1993-1994, the Real stabilization plan was successfully 
implemented and paved the way for Cardoso’s victory – once again against Lula da Silva.  
 
Failed stabilization attempts: Collor I and Collor II, 1990-91 
  
In contrast with preceding heterodox stabilization attempts Plano Brasil Novo [New 
Brazil Plan], best known as plan Collor I, was widely expected to be implemented in the 
beginning of the new president’s term of office given the marked deterioration of the 
economic position, especially the acceleration of monthly inflation beyond the 80% 
mark. Its inspiration was the Erhard Plan, adopted in Germany in 1948 to wipe out 
excessive savings in the hands of economic agents. This made possible to unfreeze prices 
without fear that savings would put pressure on prices in a situation of supply constraints. 
 
The plan included a price and wage freeze with a commitment to adjust price and wages 
in such a way as to avoid transmitting the high inflation inherited from the past. Monetary 
reform involved a simple change in denomination of the currency from cruzado novo to 
cruzeiro. About 80% of total financial assets beyond a specific threshold were frozen for 
eighteen months in the form of deposits in the Central Bank earning “monetary 
correction” plus 6% a year. These deposits were to be freed over a period of one year. 
Government payments were exempted from freezing and it was possible to settle debts 
though the transfer of blocked deposits in the Central Bank. 
 
Another pillar of the plan was to be a fiscal reform which would turn around an 
operational deficit of 8% of GDP into a surplus of 2% of GDP. While there was not much   29
success in implementing a fiscal reform, the fiscal impact of the plan by, among other 
things, temporarily reducing interest on public debt was of around 5% of GDP. 
 
In the first month of inflation which was not contaminated by past inflation, the rate was 
much beyond the less than 1% widely expected by analysts. In May the monthly inflation 
rate was back to 7.7% signaling defeat. By August it was almost 13% and approaching 
20% in January 1991. Problems of all types undermined the plan. In spite of provisions 
which established a system of indexation preannouncements the government decided to 
skip its compromise in the first month. In fact operational problems involving the 
elaboration of a new official price index to be used by the authorities were never solved. 
The government adopted a threatening stance in relation to the civil service which often 
did not correspond to its concrete initiatives in the field of reform. This alienated 
segments of the government machinery which were essential for the implementation of 
its stabilization plan. 
 
It was not without irony that a government which had strongly stressed its criticism 
towards public policies based on the discretionary choice of winners – for instance in 
relation to protectionist policies – should adopt such policies in relation to the release of 
deposits frozen by the stabilization plan. In the best tradition of rent-seeking policies 
special interests with political clout managed to extract their assets from clutches of 
Leviathan. The breach of property rights was selective. Monetary expansion related to 
exceptions was substantial and likely to have contributed to the plan’s failure.  Be it 
because of these ad hoc increases in liquidity or because of deeper reasons affecting the 
government’s ability to have a clear picture about the pace of required remonetization the 
overall impact on liquidity did contribute to ease the return of inflation. Towards the last 
quarter of the year the defeat of still another stabilization attempt was there for all to see.  
 
There were widespread criticisms of the plan. Some analysts concentrated on the 
appalling implementation. Others were more concerned with fundamentals. Some of 
these insisted that inflation was explained by variations in the means of payment and that 
the freezing of quasi money was not really relevant as a counter to inflation. Little was   30
known in any case about the “safe” rate of remonetization which would be compatible 
with low inflation. The government in fact abstained from having an active monetary 
policy. Some commentators feared that by violating property rights in its move to freeze 
liquidity the government had unreasonably increased the risk of a run towards holding 
assets in foreign currency which had been until then been a clear distinction between the 
experience of Brazil and of other Latin American economies with a similar record of high 
inflation. 
 
Stabilization measures were accompanied by a comprehensive reform programme. This 
included a reform of public administration envisaging a significant shrinking of the 
number of civil servants, a trade policy reform with the aim of opening up the Brazilian 
protected market, liberalization of foreign exchange policy, structural tax reform so as to 
sharply reduce exemptions and widespread tax expenditure. There was explicit intention 
of privatizing much of the rather large Brazilian public sector. The lasting contributions 
of the Collor government to the much needed structural reforms would prove to be its 
trade liberalization element and the beginning of a massive, successful and corruption-
free privatization programme which was deepened after 1994.   
 
1990 was a bad year for growth: GDP fell by almost 5%, comfortably breaking the 
previous record in modern Brazilian economic history of a 3.1% contraction in 1981. 
Agricultural output fell -3.7% reflecting a disastrous performance of crops. Gross fixed 
capital formation fell from a level above 26% of GDP in 1989 – a reflection of the 
acceleration of inflation – to 20.7%. The substantial inherited balance of trade was eroded 
during 1990. It was of US$11 billion as exports fell by almost 10% and imports increased 
more than 12% in spite of the steep fall in the level of activity as prices were reduced 
with the beginning of trade liberalization.   
  
A new stabilization plan– called Collor II – was implemented in early 1991.  With rather 
modest hindsight it seems a desperate affair. It has been termed as an attempt to delay 
apocalypse as the government faced problems to sell its debt without increasing interest 
rates and the financial position of the state of São Paulo was especially fragile. The   31
government decided to bail out debtors through increased liquidity and try to double its 
bet. Most of the well known ingredients were there. There was a price freeze, including 
the exchange rate. There were no rules on price unfreezing: it was left at the 
government’s discretion.  Wages were converted by the 12-month average. A new tablita 
was introduced to convert debts based on the assumption that inflation would 
instantaneously fall to zero. As there was no monetary reform this made conversions – 
which clearly involved a discretionary reduction of the present value of credits – 
particularly vulnerable to future legal questioning. In an effort to break inflationary 
inertia there was an overhaul of indexation rules with old indices being substituted by a 
new, forward looking, one. There was an attempt to lengthen the maturity of internal debt 
through taxation. There was even an upbeat program of investments to counter recession. 
  
The favourable effects were extremely short-lived. Monthly inflation was reduced from 
20% to around 7% and was held there for three months then started to rise again. Real 
interest rates fell significantly then increased again. Wage increases helped a timid 
reduction in the speed of fall in the level of capacity. By May, Zélia Cardoso de Mello, 
Collor’s first Minister of Finance, was on the way out after failing in her two shots 
against inflation, amidst a wave of press allegations of administrative misconduct and 
after having established a rather controversial public image. More was going to surface 
until the end of the following year and the president ended up by being ousted by an 
impeachment because of  his improper conduct.    
 
Interregum and turmoil, 1991-1993 
 
Marcílio Moreira, the new minister, faced an extraordinarily difficult task because of both 
the unfavourable inheritance left by Cardoso de Mello and of the rapidly deteriorating 
political climate, with the president increasingly under pressure with accusations of 
corruption originating from his own family. The new minister interpreted his task as 
being to hold the fort amidst very bad conditions and concentrate in defusing 
expectations that the wave of macroeconomic shocks would continue. His tasks ahead 
were clear: to end the price freeze, to return the frozen Collor I deposits, to adjust   32
misaligned public prices, slowly improve public accounts and keep inflation from getting 
totally out of control. The foreign debt question was also still not settled. 
 
The government favourably surprised the markets by anticipating the release of the 
deposits frozen in March 1990. By October most non-public prices were unfrozen. The 
misalignment of public prices had been significantly cut by the end of the year. A modest 
foreign exchange devaluation of 14% was undertaken and the exchange rate 
overvaluation since the beginning of the government was partly corrected. Real interest 
rates increased steadily from the beginning of the year to reach more than 30% on an 
yearly basis at the end of the year. Substantial primary government surpluses were 
maintained: 3% in 1991 and 2.4% in 1992. To show its commitment to trade 
liberalization the government anticipated the liberalization time schedule of 1992 and 
1993.  
 
There was some recovery in the level of economic activity in 1991. After a contraction of 
almost 5% in 1990 GDP increased 1% in 1991. In 1992 GDP contracted again 0.5%. In 
spite of this dismal performance gross fixed capital formation fell only to 18-19% of 
GDP. In 1991 the trade balance surplus remained at the same level of 1990 at around 
US$ billion. This was increased in 1992 to US$ 15.5 million as export performance 
improved. During 1992, especially in the first semester, the level of foreign reserves 
increased significantly: it was of about US$ 9 billion at the end of 1991, doubled in the 
first semester and remained at the same level until the end of the year. This, besides 
reflecting the improvement in trade data, resulted from the start of a recovery in inflows 
of foreign direct investment and transactions related to settlement of arrears of interest 
payments on the foreign debt. 
 
After the infringement of property rights entailed by the Plan Collor I there was a 
reduction in the net public debt-GDP ratio from around 50 % where it had hovered since 
1985 (peak of 55.8% in 1988) to 33% in 1993. The ratio had increased significantly in the 
early 1980s to reach the 50% plateau in 1984. This massive increase in the early 1980s 
resulted from the successive foreign exchange devaluations and from Federal government   33
bail out of the private sector which was heavily indebted in foreign currency when the 
crisis stroke.    
 
A Brazilian proposal on the foreign debt had been unsuccessfully presented in October 
1990. It was based in the conversion of foreign debt into unguaranteed 45-year bonds 
together with a bridge loan to cover arrear payments. Foreign debt owned by the private 
sector – only 10% of the total -- would be excluded from the agreement and related 
financial flows free from government control. A stop gap measure had been introduced in 
the beginning of 1991 as the government started to pay unilaterally 30% of due interest 
payments on outstanding debt and freed the big state companies to settle their debts 
independently. In April 1991 an agreement regulated the payment of arrears: 25% in cash 
in a few months, with the rest converted into US$ 7.1 billion of new bonds and with some 
options including fixed interest rates.  
 
By July 1992 an agreement had been reached in principle on a more permanent 
settlement of the Brazilian foreign debt. After approval by the Senate the Brazilian 
agreement was presented to creditors and new contracts duly signed in November 1993. 
Negotiations did not involve the IMF. This may be seen as a settlement corresponding to 
the period of Brazilian borrowing which started in 1966-67 and ended in 1982 in the 
same way as the permanent settlement of 1943 had settled the outstanding claims related 
to Brazilian borrowing between 1824 and 1931.  
 
The Brazilian agreement followed the lines of other Brady agreement entered by debtors 
since the late 1980s. These agreements involved different combinations of interest 
payments reduction and principal reduction in a way not essentially dissimilar from what 
had happened in 1943. Following the Brady structure, principal of the new debt was 
guaranteed by United States bonds as collaterals and interest payments were backed by a 
rolling guarantee. The new 30-year discount bonds carried LIBOR plus 13/16% as the 
rate of interest and involved a reduction of 35% of the original principal. There was some 
choice for creditors but there were ceilings constraining certain types of conversion 
offered so not all first options could be accommodated and creditors were redirected to   34
less demanded types of converted bonds. The total issue of new bonds was US$ 43.7 
billion. Debt reduction achieved in the Brazilian negotiation was lower than that obtained 
in several other Latin American Brady negotiations, but Brazil entered into lower 
guarantee commitments than other debtors. Negotiations on a settlement with official 
creditors in the Club of Paris were concluded in 1993 and involved US$ 13.5 billion. 
 
Following Collor’s impeachment in the end of 1992 its vice-president, Itamar Franco, 
took office.  As a president Franco confirmed all fears about his mercurial temperament 
from the beginning of his term of office. There were doubts about interest rate policy, 
price control and public prices, imprudent comments on public debt default, presidential 
resistance to privatization, a fast rotation of ministers and public venting of disagreement 
with ministers and other members of his administration. In the light of the incredible 
dance of chairs in the Ministry of Finance between October 1992 and March 1993, when 
Brazil had three different ministers in a row, the choice of Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
may be seen as the surprisingly successful outcome of a random process. Under Cardoso, 
the Real plan would be successfully implemented and, benefiting with experience 
acquired in the successive failures since 1986, would reduce yearly inflation to the one 
digit zone on a sustained basis. 
 
The Real Plan, 1993-1994 
 
Past experience underlined some of the limitations of previous heterodox attempts to 
cope with inflation in Brazil. Sustainability of initial success in controlling inflation had 
been repeatedly undermined by the lack of a credible fiscal adjustment stance. The 
difficulty of assuring that the transition from the high inflation regime to the low inflation 
regime would not entail distortion of relative prices suggested that a way out of the 
package which included sudden monetary reform and a price freeze had to be found. 
Stabilization strategy was designed in the second half of 1993. In July another monetary 
reform of the cut-the-zeros type was undertaken and cruzados novos were transformed 
into cruzeiros reais at the rate of one thousand to one. 
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The Real Plan was implemented in three stages. There was a fiscal element negotiated 
with Congress. This was followed by the creation of new unit of account which existed 
side by side with the “old” currency, the cruzeiro real. Finally, a monetary reform 
substituted the URV by the “new” currency, the real. The plan was implemented without 
the blessing of the International Monetary Fund which remained unconvinced of the 
possibility of its success. It was a further irony in the troubled history of Brazilian 
relations with the institution. 
  
From mid-1993 there was some effort, through a Programa de Ação Imediata [Program 
of Immediate Action], to focus on fiscal imbalances. The breakthrough came in the 
beginning of 1994 with the significant fiscal adjustment introduced by the Fundo Social 
de Emergência [Emergency Social Fund], through a suspension for two years of 
legislation on earmarked revenues. There was also increased taxation of financial 
intermediaries. The government acknowledged that a structural fiscal adjustment would 
have to include an overhaul of the tax system, reform of social security, recognition of 
liabilities arising from past stabilization plans, definition of limits to the fiscal imbalance 
of states and municipalities, commitment by all three level of governments on assuring 
equilibrium of their accounts on the longer term. But all this had to wait for windows of 
opportunity in the future and would depend on the government’s real commitment to 
reform. Substantial primary government surpluses were maintained: 2.6% in 1993 and 
5.1% in 1992. 
 
The Unidade Real de Valor [Real Unit of Value] – URV – was created as bridge between 
the doomed cruzeiro real and the new real. Between March and June 1994 the URV and 
the cruzeiro real coexisted as units of account. Wages were converted into URVs taking 
into account their real value in the last four months as this was the inherited indexation 
horizon. Many conversions were left to free negotiation between economic agents with 
the government having more interference in oligopolized prices. The objective was to get 
relative prices “right” during the transition period and then implement monetary reform.  
The URV value was corrected daily. Inflation in cruzeiros reais was very high – 40-50%   36
monthly – in the first half of 1994. After July, inflation in reais fell below 10% in July 
and below 1% in December.    
 
Monetary reform in the beginning of July 1994 finally introduced the real with the value 
of one URV and 2,750 cruzeiros reais. At the time of its introduction the real was also 
equal to one United States dollar. Stability was to be guaranteed by a triple “anchor”: the 
exchange rate backed by a substantial foreign reserve position (US$ 40 billion in mid-
1994); the commitment to control fiscal deficit through the Fundo Social de Emergência 
arrangement; and a clearly stated intention to limit emissions of new currency. 
 
In spite of Cardoso’s substitution as Minister of Finance in March, as he became a 
presidential candidate, the implementation of the Real plan continued without major 
problems until the end of 1994. In the second half of 1994 there were signs of a repetition 
of what had happened following the Cruzado Plan as demand for consumer durables 
overheated, especially in the case of motor cars. The government answered by lowering 
the tariff on motor car imports. As the consequences of the Mexican crisis of the end of 
1994 started to affect Brazil this move was strongly criticized, especially by those against 
trade liberalization. These criticisms tend to disregard that before December the menace 
that was being faced by the Real plan was that the level of imports was too low rather 
than too high. Imports were important to discipline domestic prices and an excessively 
large trade surplus would put monetary policy under undue strain.    
 
Both 1993 and 1994 were very good years from the point of view of growth. GDP growth 
rates of 4.9% and 5.8% were the highest since 1986. Gross fixed capital formation rose 
slightly to reach 20.8% of GDP in 1994. As imports increased in 1993 with trade 
liberalization and the recovery in the level of economic activity, the trade surplus fell by 
about US$ 2 billion to US$ 13 billion. In 1994 it was to fall further to US$ 10 billion as 
growth of imports outpaced that of exports in spite of an improvement in the terms of 
trade of more than 14%. Recovery in the inflow of foreign direct gained strength in 1993-
1994, especially after Cardoso became a minister:  US$ 6.2 billion in 1963 and US$ 8.1 
billion in 1994.   37
 
Privatization and trade liberalization  
  
Of the wide range of reforms mentioned by Collor at the beginning of his government 
only two were really important before the Real Plan in 1993-1994 and the two terms of 
office of Fernando Henrique Cardoso between 1995 and 2002. For all his denunciation of 
the wrongs of government and abuses by the civil service the administrative reform 
implemented in 1990 was little short of a disaster and its shortcomings contributed to the 
failure of his stabilization efforts. But both the privatization of public assets and the 
opening up of the Brazilian economy were major modernizing reforms which gained 
momentum after 1990. 
 
Government-controlled assets included enterprises in a wide range of activities. There 
were mining and industrial firms producing industrial and agricultural inputs (iron ore, 
steel, petrochemicals, fertilizers). Provision of many public services was also state-
controlled: telecommunications, electricity services (from generation to distribution). 
There was an important presence of the state in commercial banking. Oil was a state 
monopoly from extraction to refining. State monopoly in the provision of most public 
services meant that regulatory institutions had all been captured by providers of services 
and privatization of such “natural monopolies” would be more complex than that 
affecting more competitive sectors. Privatization would require the establishment, almost 
from scratch, of a more effective regulatory framework.  
 
There had been some timid privatization initiatives in the 1980s. But besides lip service 
they were generally related to the devolution to the private sector of assets of bankrupt 
firms which had been taken over by the government. Privatization in the 1990s naturally 
started with those enterprises in competitive sectors and sales amounting to some US$ 8.6 
billion mostly affected steel and petrochemical producers. There was an emblematic 
importance in such initial efforts as the first important public-owned modern industrial 
enterprise, the Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional, founded by Vargas back in 1940  was 
successfully privatized. It must be placed on the record that in spite of being undertaken   38
by a government whose record was fundamentally marred by serious findings of 
improper conduct, the privatization process of such assets was never questioned in spite 
of the whole complex process involving evaluation, auctions and minotity stakes.   
 
In 1990, the new government decided to overhaul the traditional trade regime based on 
high protection of the domestic market. Non-tariff barriers were entirely removed, in 
particular the import prohibitions which accompanied the import licensing system that 
Brazil had used almost continuously since 1947. Under GATT’s article XVIII:B it had 
been possible to limit imports invoking balance of payments difficulties. A unilateral 
tariff reduction schedule was announced in early 1991: the average tariff was to be 
reduced from 32.2% in 1990 to 14.2% in the beginning of 1994. In early 1992 this 
schedule was anticipated by six months so that by mid-1993 the final target had been 
reached.   
  
Difficulties emerged in successive GATT meetings until 1993 mainly concerning the so-
called new issues – intellectual property, investment and services – and agricultural 
liberalization with the European Community ending up by convincing the United States 
to give up its initially radical liberalization programme. In the final agreements in the 
World Trade Organization agricultural liberalization undertakings were to include modest 
advances on reduction in support to domestic production, improvement of market access 
and reduction of export subsidies. The Multi Fibre Arrangement was to be dismantled in 
ten years. A new agreement on services included a set of basic obligations by all 
signatories, national undertakings specifying additional liberalization schedules, and a set 
of annexes dealing with exceptions and specific sectors. Disciplines and dispute 
settlement related to intellectual property were tightened. The possibility of cross-
retaliation involving goods, services and intellectual property was created. Rules on 
investment policies ruled out policies based on export performance which had been so 
important in Brazil.   
 
The final phase of the negotiations started in Geneva in 1993 and culminated in 
Marrakesh. The overall average tariff cut on industrial products was of 32%: 38% in   39
developed economies and 25% in developing economies. All Brazilian tariffs were 
bound: on industrial products at 35% and on some agricultural products at 55%.  Before 
the Uruguay Round only 23% of Brazilian imports corresponded to bound tariff lines and 
only 6% of the lines were bound.   
 
The most important development of Brazilian commercial policy in the 1990s was the 
creation of Mercosul, Mercado Comum do Sul [Southern Common Market] established 
by the Treaty of Assunción on March 1991 to include Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and 
Uruguay. This was a development of Brazil’s rapprochement with Argentina since the 
mid-1980s. The initial agreement was that there would be a certain number of exceptions 
to a zero tariff between members of the common market: for Brazil it affected 324 items. 
By the end of 1994 it was planned that these will have disappeared with some special 
treatment of the smaller members. This understanding was revised as a regime of final 
adjustment to the customs union was introduced in early 1995 to cope with an extension 
of exceptions to free intra-Mercosur trade. As a common market Mercosur had to adopt a 
unified external tariff. This was not simple as the interests of Brazil, a significant 
producer of capital goods and informatics products, conflicted with those of other 
members. While Brazil wished to maintain a high tariff on such products the other 
members wished to maintain low investment costs.  
 
Negotiations in late 1994 led to the adoption of a common external tariff varying between 
zero and 20% in steps of two percentage points. But there were three exceptions lists: 
products included in a basic national list, capital goods and informatics and 
telecommunications products.  Brazil’s basic initial list originally included 175 items. 
Brazil’s exceptions for capital goods – some 900 items – would converge (from above) to 
a CET rate of 14% by 2001. Brazil’s exceptions for informatics and telecommunications 
products – some 200 items – would converge to a CET rate of 16% in 2006. Another 
important event related to regional trade integration besides Mercosur was that in 
December 1994 it was agreed in Miami that negotiations should open on a free trade area 
of the Americas.  
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In the early 1990s, Brazilian trade with Argentina rose spectacularly, especially Brazilian 
exports. The share of Argentina in Brazilian exports increased from 2% in 1990 to 9.5% 
in 1994 and the share of imports in total Brazilian imports from 6.8% to 10.9%. There 




The period between 1980 and 1994 should be seen as a transitional period following a 
severe balance of payments and debt crisis in the beginning of the 1980s. This resulted in 
a deep financial crisis affecting all levels of public finance in Brazil. With high inflation 
becoming chronic and accelerating there were repeated attempts to stabilize first using 
orthodox, then more heterodox policies. But the fiscal element was always insufficiently 
developed and a long sequence of attempts would fail. In sharp contrast with the past the 
economy grew very little, barely enough to hold a stagnant GDP per capita. 
 
The final years of the transitional period culminated in the Real plan which was 
successful in taming inflation and in its first two years had raised hopes that the growth 
path had been rediscovered. The victory of Fernando Henrique Cardoso was a direct 
result of successful stabilization resulting from the Real plan. The way ahead was to 
implement a comprehensive program of reforms that would make possible a return to 
steady and significant economic growth.   
 Table 2  Brazil, main economic variables, selected years, 1980-2003  
  1980  1986  1990  1994 1998 1999 2002  2003 
Resident population
*,  million  121.6 137.7  147.6 156.8 165.7 167.9 174.6 176.9
GDP (1980=100)  100 114.5 117.1 130.7 144.6 145.7 157.0 156.7
####
GDP per capita (1980=100)  100 100.8 95.9 100.8 105.5 104.9 108.7 107.1
Gross fixed capital formation as % 
of GDP   23.6 20.0 20.7 20.7 19.7 18.9 18.3 18.0







GDP deflator yearly rate, %  90.4 149.2 2595.6 2240.2 4.8 4.7 10.2 12.8
7
Real exchange rate**,  1980=100  100 106.3 64.6 49.9 49.5 67.4 73.4 62.2
Exports, US$ billion  20.1 22.3 31.4 43.5 51.2 48.0 60.4 73.1
Imports, US$ billion   23.0 14.0 20.7 33.1 57.7 49.3 47.2 48.3
Current account, US$ billion   -12.8 -5.3 -3.8 -1.7 -33.6 -25.1 -7.7 4.1
Foreign direct investment inflow, 
US$ billion***
  1.5 0.2 0.3 1.9 23.3 27.6 18.8 12.9
Total foreign debt, US$ billion  64.3 111.2 123.4 148.4 241.6 241.5 227.7 235.4
Reserves
# , US$ billion   6.9 6.8 10.0 38.8 44.6 36.3 37.8 49.3
Terms of  trade (1980=100)  100 89.2 90.8 112.2 129.6 112.5 114.0 112.5
Primary surplus, % GDP  n.a. 1.6 2.7 5.2 0 3.2 3.9 4.4
Total public debt-GDP ratio, %  n.a. 49.0 36.7 30.0 41.7 48.7 55.5 58.7
Prime interest rate
## USA, %  15.3 8.3 10.0 7.1 8.3 8.0 4.7 4.1
SELIC interest rate
###, %   90.1 71.5 1412 1383 29.5 26.3 19.1 23.4
* Mid-year. 
** The higher the more devalued is the Brazilian currency. Domestic currency-US dollar exchange rate. Brazilian and US wholesale 
prices. 
*** Net foreign investment, including reinvestment. 
# Central Bank international liquidity concept. 
## Average over days in year. 
### Yearly nominal interest rates on Federal government paper, after 1990 the SELIC rate.
 
####Provisional. 
Sources: IBGE, Brazilian Central Bank, International Monetary Fund. The evolution of the real minimum wage was nor presented as 
there many methodological problems involved. See IBGE, Estatísticas do Século XX, chapter on earnings and prices. Bibliographical essay   
  
The number of relevant publications on the Brazilian economy since 1980 is immense. This, 
together with limitations of space, constraints related to the availability of material in English and 
the existence of works of a more general scope which incorporate the findings of more specialized 
literature means that many worthwhile contributions have not been explicitly mentioned. The focus 
here is on economic policy, a reflection of problems which have dominated Brazil’s economic 
agenda in the period. Readers should also consult the bibliographical essay on the 1930-1980 as it 
contains material which is relevant for the later period and not all titles have been repeated here.   
 
The debt to Dionísio Carneiro and Eduardo Modiano is obvious. Their chapters, D.D. Carneiro and 
E.M. Modiano, ‘Ajuste externo e desequilíbrio interno: 1980-1984’ and  E.M. Modiano, ‘A ópera 
dos três cruzados: 1985-1989’ in M. de P. Abreu (ed.), A ordem do progresso. Cem anos de política 
econômica republicana (Rio de Janeiro, 1990) and D.D. Carneiro, ‘1974-1994: os desafios da 
estabilização postergada’ in Bolívar Lamounier, Dionísio Dias Carneiro and Marcelo de Paiva 
Abreu, 50 anos de Brasil. 50 anos de Fundação Getúlio Vargas (Rio de Janeiro, 1994) have been 
extensively used here. A standard general source in English for the Brazilian economy is Werner 
Baer, The Brazilian Economy: growth and development, 5
th edition, (Westport, CT,  2001). See also, 
Fábio Giambiagi and Maurício Mesquita Moreira (eds.), A economia brasileira nos anos 90, (Rio de 
Janeiro, 1990), and, for public finance aspects, Fábio Giambiagi and Ana Cláudia Além, Finanças 
públicas. Teoria e prática no Brasil, 2
nd edition (Rio de Janeiro, 2000). 
 
Data sources on the Brazilian economy include prominently Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e   
Estatística, Estatísticas do Século XX (Rio de Janeiro, 2003) and the enclosed CD-ROM. This is also 
available at www.ibge.gov.br. See also Ipeadata at www.ipea.gov.br and www.bcb.gov.br for 
statistics presented by the Ministry of Planning (IPEA) and the Brazilian Central Bank. The Central 
Bank’s Relatório is a good source on economic policy for the period. Brasil-Panorama Econômico, 
a discontinued series published by the Central Bank between 1983 and 1996, is also useful. Data on 
trade and tariffs can be obtained the site of the Ministry of Development, Industry and Trade at 
www.mdic.gov.br. For data on foreign trade indices see www.funcex.com.br.   
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On the early contributions on inertial inflation see the bibliographical essay which follows the 
chapter on 1930-1980. P.Arida (ed.), Dívida externa, recessão e ajuste estrutural. O Brasil diante 
da crise ( Rio de Janeiro, 1982) reflected  a sample of views of what was to become the core of 
economists proposing alternative stabilization policies. For contemporary alternative views see, for 
instance, J.M Cardoso de Mello and  L.G.M Belluzzo, ‘Reflexões sobre a crise’ in L. Coutinho and 
L. Belluzzo (eds.), Desenvolvimento capitalista no Brasil: Ensaios sobre a cris (São Paulo, 1982). 
See also Mário Henrique Simonsen, ‘A inflação brasileira: lições e perspectivas’, Revista de 
Economia Política, 5/4, 1985.   
  
Contributions by those directly or indirectly related to the more technical aspects of the cruzado plan 
include: P. Arida and A.L. Resende, ‘Inertial inflation and monetary reform in Brazil’, in J. 
Williamson (ed.), Inflation and Indexation: Argentina, Brazil and Israel (Cambridge, MA, 1985) ; 
P. Arida, ‘Reajuste salarial e inflaçäo’, Pesquisa e Planejamento Econômico, 12/2, 1982; F.L. 
Lopes, O choque heterodoxo: Combate à inflaçäo e reforma monetária (Rio de Janeiro, 1986) and 
O desafio da hiperinflaçäo (Rio de Janeiro, 1989); E.M. Modiano, Da inflaçäo ao cruzado: A 
política econômica no primeiro ano da Nova República (Rio de Janeiro, 1986), and ‘The cruzado 
first attempt: The Brazilian stabilization program of February 1986’ in M. Bruno, G. Di Tella, 
R.Dornbusch and S. Fisher (eds.), Inflation Stabilization: Argentina, Israel, Brazil, Bolivia and 
Mexico, (Cambridge, MA, 1988); E.M. Modiano, Inflaçäo, inércia e conflito (Rio de Janeiro, 1988); 
Edmar Bacha, ‘Vicissitudes of recent stabilization attempts in Brazil and the IMF alternative’ in J. 
Williamson (ed.), IMF Conditionality (Washington D.C., 1983`), ‘Choques externos e perspectivas 
de crescimento: o caso do Brasil’, Pesquisa e Planejamento Econômico, 14/3, 1984, ‘Moeda, inércia 
e conflito: Reflexöes sobre políticas de estabilização’, Pesquisa e Planejamento Econômico, 18/1,  
1988; Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira. ‘Brazil's inflation and the Cruzado Plan, 1985-1988’ in Pamela S. 
Falk (ed.), Inflation: Are We Next? Hyperinflation and Solutions in Argentina, Brazil and Israel, 
(Boulder, CO, 1990); Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira and Yoshiaki Nakano, The Theory of Inertial 
Inflation, (Boulder, CO, 1987).  
 
See also: Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, Joaquim Elói Cirne de Toledo, José Paulo Zeetano Chahad, 
Juarez Caetano Baldini Rizzieri and Eduardo Pereira de Carvalho (eds.), O Plano Cruzado na visão 
dos economistas da USP (São Paulo, 1986) and Ricardo Carneiro (ed.), Política econômica da Nova   44
República (Rio de Janeiro, 1986) and Paulo Rabello de Castro and M. Ronci, ‘Sixty years of 
populism in Brazil’ in R. Dornbusch. and S. Edwards (eds.), The Macroeconomics of Populism in 
Latin America. A National Bureau of Economic Research Conference Report (Chicago and London, 
1991). 
 
The two Collor plans are covered in C. de Faro (ed.) Plano Collor. Avaliações e perspectivas (Rio 
de Janeiro, 1990); Clóvis de Faro, A economia pós Plano Collor II (Rio de Janeiro, 1991); and 
Carlos Eduardo Carvalho, ‘O fracasso do Plano Collor: erros de execução ou de concepção?’, 
Economia, 4/2, 2003. See also L. C. Bresser Pereira,. ‘Hiperinflação e estabilização no Brasil: o 
primeiro Plano Collor’, Revista de Economia Política, 11/3, 1991.   
  
On the Real plan, see Franco, G. H. O Plano Real e outros ensaios (Rio de Janeiro,  1995) and ‘The 
Real Plan and the exchange rate’, Essays in International Finance no. 217, April 2000, International 
Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University; Edmar Bacha, ‘Plano Real: uma 
avaliação preliminar’, Revista do BNDES, 2/3 and ‘Plano Real: uma segunda avaliação’ in   
IPEA/CEPAL, O Plano Real e outras experiências internacionais de estabilização (Brasília, 1997). 
  
On inflation and the financial system see Dinonísio Carneiro and Pedro Bodin de Moraes, ‘La 
inflación y la evolución del sistema financiero brasileño’ in C. Massad and R. Zahler (eds.), Deuda 
interna y estabilidad financiera (Buenos Aires, 1988). On indexation the reference is M.H. 
Simonsen, 30 anos de indexação (Rio de Janeiro, 1995).  
  
On foreign debt history of negotiations see Ceres Aires Cerqueira, Dívida externa brasileira, second 
edition, www.bcb.gov.br/htms/Infecon/DividaRevisada. On stabilization and the balance of 
payments, see C.F. Díaz-Alejandro, ‘Latin American debt: I don't think we are in Kansas anymore, 
Brookings Papers in Economic Activity, 2, 1984; Dionísio D. Carneiro, ‘Long run adjustment, debt 
crisis and the changing role of stabilisation policies in the Brazilian recent experience’ in R. Thorp 
and L. Whitehead (eds.), Debt and Adjustment in Latin America (London, 1986) and also 
Stabilization and Adjustment Policies and Programmes: Brazil (Helsinki, 1987) and ‘Brazil x IMF: 
logic and story of a stalemate’ in S. Griffith-Jones (ed.), Managing Third World Debt (Brighton, 
1988); A. Fishlow, ‘Conditionality and willingness to pay: some parallels from the 1890s’ in B.   45
Eichengreen and P. Lindert (eds.), The International Debt in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, 
MA, 1989); Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, ‘A turning point in the debt crisis: Brazil, the US Treasury, 
and the World Bank’, Revista de Economia Política, 19/2, 1999;  P.N. Batista Jr, Mito e realidade 
da dívida externa brasileira (Rio de Janeiro, 1983) and Da crise internacional à moratória 
brasileira (Rio de Janeiro,  1988); E. Cardoso and A. Fishlow, ‘The macroeconomics of the 
Brazilian external debt’ in J. Sachs (ed.), Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, 
Volume 2. Country Studies: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico (Chicago, 1990); G. Oliveira, ‘IMF 
stabilization plans in Brazil’, Cadernos de Economia 4, 1991.  
 
On public accounts and growth see Rogério Werneck, ‘Public sector adjustment to externals shocks 
and domestic pressures in Brazil’ in Felipe Larraín and Marcelo Selowsky (eds.), The Public Sector 
and the Latin American Crisis (San Francisco, 1991)   
and Dionisio D. Carneiro and Rogério L.F. Werneck. ‘Obstacles to investment resumption in 
Brazil’, in Edmar L. Bacha (ed.), Savings and Investment Requirements for Resumption of Growth 
in Latin America (Washington, D.C., 1993). See also Edmar Bacha, ‘A three-gap model of foreign 
transfers and the GDP growth rate in developing countries’, Journal of Development Economics, 
32/2, 1990 and Luciana Sá, ‘Restrições ao crescimento da economia brasileira: exercícios com 
modelos de 3 hiatos’ (unpublished Master’s dissertation, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de 
Janeiro, 1993).  
 
On fiscal federalism see Fernando Rezende, ‘Federalismo fiscal no Brasil’,  Revista de Economia 
Política, 15/3), 1995. See also Eustáquio Reis, Fernando Blanco, Lucilene Morandi, Merida Medina 
and Marcelo de Paiva Abreu, ‘Século XX nas contas nacionais’ in Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia 
e  Estatística, Estatísticas do Século XX. On state enterprises in the 1980’s see R.L. Werneck, 
Empresas estatais e política macroeconômica (Rio de Janeiro, 1987). On early privatization, see 
Armando Castellar Pinheiro and Fábio Giambiagi, ‘Brazilian privatization in the 1990s’, World 
Development, 22/5, 1994. 
 
On trade and industrial policies the Trade Policy Review reports elaborated each four years by the 
GATT and after 1993 by the WTO are extremely useful. See: General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. Trade Policy Review: Brazil 1992 (Geneva, 1993), World Trade Organization, and Trade   46
Policy Review Brazil 1996 (Geneva, 1997). There are two relevant World Bank studies on trade and 
industrial policies in Brazil in the 1970s and 1980s: the very comprehensive World Bank, Brazil: 
industrial policies and manufactured exports (Washington, D.C., 1983), and World Bank, Trade 
Policy in Brazil: the case for reform, Report No. 7765-BR (Washington, D.C., 1990).  
 
Other references include Donald V. Coes, ‘Brazil’ in Demetris Papageorgiou, Michael Michaely and 
Armeane M. Choksi (eds.), Liberalizing Foreign Trade. Volume 4:  Brazil, Colombia and Peru 
(Cambridge, MA and Oxford, 1991); Winston Fritsch and Gustavo Franco, ‘The political economy 
of trade and industrial policy reform in Brazil in the 1990s’, Serie Reformas de Política Publica 6 
(Santiago, 1993); Mauricio Mesquita Moreira, Industrialization, Trade and Market Failures. The 
Role of Government Intervention in Brazil and South Korea (Basingstoke and London, 1995); W. 
Suzigan and Annibal V. Villela, Industrial Policy in Brazil (Campinas, 1997).  
 
For tariff policy and export incentives, see Honório Kume, ‘A política tarifária brasileira no período 
1980-1988: Avaliação e Reforma’, mimeo, EPICO 17, IPEA, Rio de Janeiro; Honório Kume, Guida 
Piani and Carlos Frederico B. de Souza.  ‘A política brasileira de importação no período 1987-98: 
descrição e avaliação’ in C.H. Corseuil and H. Kume (eds.), A abertura comercial nos anos 1990 – 
Impactos sobre emprego e salários (Rio de Janeiro,  2003); Renato Baumann Neves and Heloiza 
Camargos Moreira, ‘Os incentivos às exportações brasileiras de produtos manufaturados-1969-
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